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Managing Information Technology Project Escalation
and De-Escalation: An Approach-Avoidance
Perspective
Gary Pan, Shan L. Pan, and Michael Newman
Abstract—This paper presents an integrated theoretical process
model for identifying, describing, and analyzing the complex es-
calation and de-escalation phenomena in software development
projects. The approach-avoidance theory is used to integrate core
elements of various escalation theories into a holistic, explanatory
framework for the two phenomena. We use a process model to iden-
tify antecedent conditions, sequences of events, critical incidents,
and outcomes over the course of a project. The analysis also oper-
ates at multiple levels: project, work, and environment. This high-
lights the recursive interactions between project, organizational
work activities, and their contexts during the software project de-
velopment process. By conceiving the processes of commitment
escalation and de-escalation as sequences of events involving re-
curring approach-avoidance decision conflict, this research allows
for a deeper understanding of the ambiguity and dilemma that de-
cision makers face during project escalations and de-escalations.
Our proposed model was both informed by a detailed case study
that exhibits both project escalation and de-escalation conditions,
and at the same time, illuminates the perspectives of various stake-
holders.
Index Terms—Approach-avoidance theory, case study,
de-escalation, escalation, process theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
E SCALATION of commitment is a common and costlyproblem among runaway information systems (IS) projects
[20], [38]. According to Keil and Mann [21], at least 30% of
all IS projects exhibit some degree of escalation. The alarming
rate has attracted many IS researchers to examine major issues
surrounding software project escalation and de-escalation [8],
[18], [23], [43]. Despite the progress in software development
methodologies over the years, this paper has identified three
major issues that have so far been inadequately addressed in
the escalation literature. First, there is an overdependence on
simplistic stage models in past escalation and de-escalation re-
search [49], [54]. Stage models can offer only limited insights
into why and how escalation and de-escalation occur during
project development. Indeed, they have been deemed mecha-
nistic or idealistic in today’s fast and turbulent organizational
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environments [55]. Second, even though several theories such
as self-justification theory [12], prospect theory [57], agency
theory [19], and others have been invoked individually to ex-
plain the escalation phenomenon [3], [57], there is no integrated
theoretical framework for examining escalation of commitment.
Indeed, Keil et al. [23, p. 656] expressed a need for future re-
search to “attempt to combine elements of these theories to cre-
ate a richer theory of this complex phenomenon.” Third, there
is lack of a multilevel analysis that not only provides analyses
at separate distinct levels but also interactions between these
levels. A multiple-level analysis would provide a thorough eval-
uation of the project and generate effective lessons learnt for
future project development.
This paper aims to address the shortcomings that we have
identified in past research on software project escalation and
de-escalation. First, to overcome the limitations of staged-based
models, we turn to punctuated equilibrium theory [15] for an
analytical framework; the theory suggests that transformation is
characterized by stable periods of evolutionary change that are
punctuated or interrupted by short periods of rapid “revolution-
ary” change [15]. From the punctuated equilibrium perspective,
IS development can be viewed as sequences of events over time
that encompass evolutionary and revolutionary changes [37].
Second, heeding the call of Keil et al. [23], we combine ele-
ments of several theories into an integrated theoretical escala-
tion model through the approach-avoidance theory. In addition,
we extend the theories to examine the process of de-escalation.
From the approach-avoidance theoretical perspective, escala-
tion and de-escalation situations can be viewed as instances of
approach-avoidance decision conflict that may result in decision
dilemma over whether to persist or desist with the project [32].
The approach-avoidance theory encompasses attributes that en-
courage or discourage persistence with the project, including
elements from several escalation theories (e.g., the sunk cost
effect from the prospect theory and information asymmetry
from the agency theory). Third, we attempt to develop a multi-
level analytical framework that permits the tracing of linkages
among causal influences that are crucial in extending escalation
cycles or triggering de-escalation across multiple contextual
levels.
The goal of this paper is, therefore, to formulate an inte-
grated theoretical process model that can be used to identify,
describe, and analyze escalation and de-escalation of com-
mitment in IS projects. Our proposed model integrates three
streams of psychological and organizational change literature:
approach-avoidance theory, punctuated equilibrium theory, and
0018-9391/$25.00 © 2008 IEEE
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF DETERMINANTS AFFECTING ESCALATION OF COMMITMENT IN IS SETTINGS
process theory. First, it draws on the approach-avoidance the-
ory [50] to analyze the recursive decision conflict faced by
decision makers over whether to persist with a project. Sec-
ond, it draws on the punctuated equilibrium theory [15] that
views the IS development process as a sequence of stable and
evolutionary events (equilibria) that are punctuated by criti-
cal and revolutionary events (disequilibria). Third, it draws on
process theories to explain how things evolve over time and
why they evolve in a particular way [26], [45]. Particularly,
the proposed model adopts narrative and visual mapping strate-
gies [26] to make sense of the escalation and de-escalation
phenomena.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we
explain the concepts of escalation and de-escalation of commit-
ment and outline how the approach-avoidance theory can act
as an integrating theoretical model that brings together several
theories and creates richer escalation and de-escalation theo-
ries. Next, we explain the concepts of punctuated equilibrium,
events, and critical incidents, which help analyze the IS develop-
ment process. This is followed by the presentation of a specific
case study conducted from 2002 to 2003, where we consider
the development process of an IS project that initially went out
of control, then drifted, was turned around but was eventually
abandoned. We use a process model to identify and describe the
periods of escalation and de-escalation and explain why they oc-
curred. The model represents a powerful analytical framework
that can organize project development into a series of events and
critical incidents surrounded by ambiguity and decision conflict
over whether to persist or desist with a troubled project.
II. PAST RESEARCH
A. Escalation of Commitment to IS Projects
Escalation of commitment is a phenomenon that refers to sit-
uations where decision makers commit additional resources to
what appears to be a failing course of action [54]. Early escala-
tion studies suggest that the escalation phenomenon represents
a syndrome of decision errors that tend to lock decision makers
into a course of action [54]. However, an alternative defini-
tion [2] suggests that escalation may result from the dilemma
caused by the interplay between the degree of commitment to
a course of action and the amount of equivocality perceived
in feedback on prior investments and in expectations for the
future. In this perspective, project escalation is said to occur
when there is continued commitment and negative informa-
tion [20]. Previous research has suggested that escalation is a
complex phenomenon that may be influenced by many differ-
ent factors. Staw and Ross [54] group these factors into four
categories: project, psychological, social, and structural. These
factors have been used widely in experimental based studies [52]
and case studies [20], [38] to explain the escalation phenomenon
in IS settings. Table I summarizes the determinants affecting
project escalation that have been widely discussed in the IS
literature.
While Staw and Ross’s [54] escalation prototype provides
a useful taxonomy of factors that could explain why projects
escalate, little is known about the process of escalation and how
the context of past behaviors and decisions are likely to affect
the future trajectory of IS project development [30].
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TABLE II
FOUR THEORIES OF ESCALATION AND THE KEY CONSTRUCTS DERIVED FROM EACH THEORY (EXTRACTED FROM [23])
B. De-Escalation of Commitment to IS Projects
De-escalation of commitment is defined as the “reversal of es-
calating commitments to failing courses of action, either through
project termination or redirection” [22, p. 65]. Our review of the
de-escalation literature finds several triggering activities that
can promote de-escalation of commitment in IS settings. For
example, “Changes in the top management or project champi-
onship” [18], “Implementing early warning system” [8], [44],
and “Awareness of unambiguously negative feedback” [22], etc.
One should not assume that these de-escalation activities will
be instantaneously carried out once unambiguous negative feed-
back is received [13]. According to Montealegre and Keil’s [35]
de-escalation model, a de-escalation process passes through four
phases: 1) problem recognition; 2) reexamination of prior course
of action; 3) search for alternative course of action; and 4) im-
plementing an exit strategy. While Montealegre and Keil’s [35]
four-phase de-escalation model may fit well with large-scale
IS project contexts and has provided useful insights on the
de-escalation process, we view that an alternative explanatory
model may be necessary to explain the de-escalation process in
other types of IS projects (e.g., smaller scale projects). This is
especially important in today’s multidimensional project envi-
ronments where contextual differences play an important role
in determining the appropriateness of a particular model and
processes may be more chaotic than previously believed.
C. Approach-Avoidance Theory
A review of the IS development literature suggests that re-
searchers have used several different psychological and social
theories to explain why individuals continue with failing courses
of action [38]. Among the theories, Mann [31] and Keil et al. [23]
have identified the approach-avoidance theory as a major theory
that can predict escalation. In general, escalation of commit-
ment has been viewed as instances of approach-avoidance con-
flict [50]. Approach-avoidance theory [27] captures the essence
of complex situations that create conflict in the mind of a de-
cision maker over whether to continue or withdraw [32]. The
decision maker must weigh the positive and negative attributes
in order to decide which is stronger—the need to approach or the
need to avoid [8]. Under approach-avoidance theory, escalation
is conceptualized as a behavior that results when driving forces
that encourage persistence seem to outweigh restraining forces
that encourage abandonment [50]. In Keil et al.’s [23] study of
the four theories of escalation (see Table II), the authors indi-
cate strong evidence of the approach-avoidance theory’s ability
to predict escalation. The approach-avoidance theory was found
to have the strongest predictive power about project escalation
among the four theories in their study.
Finally, Mann [32] developed an approach-avoidance escala-
tion model that suggests that there are two types of attributes
that influence project continuation decisions in escalation situ-
ations: attributes that encourage persistence and attributes that
discourage it. Her model includes factors related to: 1) cost
of withdrawal; 2) reward for success; 3) completion proxim-
ity; 4) cost of persistence; and 5) ambiguity about a project’s
future. In an earlier study, Mann [32] also tested four alter-
native theories (approach-avoidance, self-justification, agency,
and prospect) against one another and found that these theo-
ries are much more intertwined than previously supposed. More
importantly, the findings show that the escalation phenomenon
in a single project can be explained by more than one theory.
Subsequently, Keil et al. [23] conducted a study to test whether
constructs associated with different escalation theories can be
used to discriminate between IS projects that escalate and those
that do not. In their study, Keil et al. [23, p. 656] called for future
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research to “attempt to combine elements of these theories to
create a richer theory of this complex phenomenon . . . (as) es-
calation is a complex phenomenon and . . . more sophisticated
models are needed to explain escalation behavior.” The review
of the escalation and de-escalation literature highlights several
knowledge gaps that this paper seeks to address. In the next
section, we introduce an alternative analytical framework that
can identify, describe, and explain the phenomena of escalation
and de-escalation of commitment in IS projects.
III. GENERAL STRUCTURE, BOUNDARY CONDITIONS,
AND CONTENT OF THE PROPOSED MODEL
This study views IS development processes as exhibiting a
property of path dependency [14]. These processes may be an-
alyzed as a sequence of evolutionary steps where each achieved
state is an outcome of an approach-avoidance decision influ-
enced by past process history and the current state of the envi-
ronment. In our proposed approach, a punctuated equilibrium
model is used to aid the empirical detection of repeated patterns
of social activity and complex social history [37], [44], [46].
Here, a “state of equilibrium” indicates that the project group
has agreed on project leadership responsibilities and targets such
as budget, manpower level, and project completion date. Project
development will continue unless pushed to change by some un-
expected events (such as a major environmental change), or an
intentional change is introduced to address a new need in the
project [39]. The punctuated equilibrium model entertains two
types of changes: small, incremental ones (first-order changes)
that in themselves do not change the so-called deep structure.
This is the normal situation. This relative stability is then punc-
tuated with more significant changes (second-order changes)
that at least have the potential to get the stakeholders to recon-
sider the status quo and change the deep structure. For example,
in our study, actions (small, incremental changes) were taking
place throughout the project up to event 14. But the sudden
drop in demand (and the concomitant causes for the drop) was
the trigger for management (when they recognized the prob-
lem) to reconsider the viability of the project and its eventual
abandonment.
As a general condition for the applicability of the model,
events are assumed to be instances of social action relating to
an IS development process [17], [51]. Events are categorized
into three types: positive, ambiguous, and negative. Positive
events signify legitimacy and acceptance of the project by the
project group, and serve as the basis for the project to pro-
ceed in the agreed manner. Negative events represent rejection
of the project and are likely to leave project group members in
conflict. A project is said to have entered an escalation cycle fol-
lowing a series of negative project events and the commitment of
more resources, when decision makers neither decide to aban-
don the project nor take corrective actions despite unambiguous
negative feedback [20]. The third type is the ambiguous event
where project group members neither reject nor accept the state
of project development. Ambiguous events are most suscepti-
ble to intervention by interested parties external to the project
group; for example, top managers may intervene for strategic
reasons [20]. The uncertainty inherent in ambiguity presents the
opportunity for such interventions to influence the IS develop-
ment process [9]. Critical incidents are those that provide the
opportunity for prior poor performance to be addressed, sur-
facing the unsatisfactory experiences of project members and
allowing for future needs to be anticipated. They are events
that punctuate an ongoing process and offer opportunities to
challenge the status quo. When a project stops after a period of
escalation, two outcomes are possible subsequently: completion
or abandonment.
To illustrate how events are classified in the model, we map
positive, ambiguous and negative events according to the con-
ventions in Fig. 1. If a positive project event is followed by an
ambiguous project event, then that project event is shown de-
scending from the positive area of the map into the ambiguous
area. Similarly, if a project event in the negative area is fol-
lowed by an ambiguous project event, then that project event
is shown ascending from the negative area into the ambigu-
ous area. The model suggests that a project emerges within
the organization and develops its own boundaries; these bound-
aries give the project its own identity, which is different from
that of the day-to-day operations of the organization [39]. Fur-
thermore, both project and organizational work activities exist
and are expected to interact in parallel and also with their con-
texts. Project-level events consist of material and uncontrollable
events within or outside the project that influence the project. A
good example is key personnel leaving or entering the project.
Work-level events consist of important events within existing
work processes that influence the work system (sometimes re-
ferred to as the legacy system). A work system can be defined
as a system in which human participants and/or machines per-
form a business process using resources to produce products
and/or services for internal or external customers [1]. Critical
work-level events, which may be coordinating events, are also
presented in Fig. 1. They follow the same event numbers as the
corresponding project-level events. Likewise, the critical envi-
ronmental events that interact with the project process also use
the same event numbering. The sequence of work-level events
progresses alongside the sequence of project events and envi-
ronmental events. At several critical instances, project events
would intersect with both work- and environmental-level events
that may affect the trajectory of project development. For exam-
ple, a poor performance resulting from the legacy system might
trigger a financial crisis in the company that, once recognized,
could affect the IS project’s progress materially as its budget
comes under greater scrutiny.
Antecedent conditions are essentially the legacy of the his-
tory from prior projects [45]. Antecedent conditions play an
important role in project development since history may repeat
itself. In the IS Division (ISD), patterns of past failures tend
to be reproduced unless decisive changes are made to break
the pattern [37]. Moreover, project events can be continually
influenced by their contexts: both organizational context (inner
context) and contexts beyond the organization (outer context).
At every event, there are corresponding sets of approach and
avoidance attributes. These attributes encompass key elements
from several theories; the attributes could therefore act as an
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Fig. 1. Integrated theoretical process model of commitment escalation and de-escalation in IS projects.
integrating theoretical framework for the examination of the es-
calation and de-escalation phenomena. Fig. 1 shows the general
structure of the model. Table III shows a summary of defini-
tions of the terms used in the integrated process model. In the
next section, we will introduce the case project that we have
used in studying the processes of escalation and de-escalation
of commitment.
IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A. Research Strategy
The main research method in this study is to use an inter-
pretive, in-depth case study [25]. The case study method is an
appropriate means of empirical inquiry when the phenomena to
be studied are complex and not easily separated from their orga-
nizational context [26]. Our case study focuses on escalation and
de-escalation of commitment in an IS project in British Utilities
(BU, a pseudonym), a large utility provider based in the U.K. The
project was initiated to resolve the problem of long telephone
queues at BU’s call center. The system to be implemented was
a telephone queue removal system. At the time of the field re-
searcher’s access into BU at around August 2002, the organiza-
tion had just abandoned its project. From the site selection stand-
point, BU has proved to be an interesting and important case to
study. It demonstrates how an organization can become over-
committed in constructing a new system, subsequently aban-
doning it abruptly. Field research (on-site observations, inter-
views, and documentation reviews) was conducted over ten
months (November 2002 to September 2003). A total of 29
interviews were conducted with 25 interviewees. Each session
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TABLE III
SUMMARY OF THE DEFINITIONS OF THE TERMS USED IN THE INTEGRATED PROCESS MODEL
lasted 1–1.5 h. Data were collected mainly through personal in-
terviews with several senior executives, IS personnel, and users.
Personal interviews were supplemented by direct observations,
documents, and artifacts, including organization charts, annual
reports, articles in the business press, and internal documenta-
tion. Interviews were based on topic guides, which indicated
relevant probes at suitable junctures. The interviewees were
asked to describe the IS development and specific comments
for illustrating general observations were sought, but they were
not asked to force their experiences into any preestablished cat-
egories. More vivid events (the resignations of call center man-
ager, project cancellation, etc.) were of special interest as they
helped multiple interpretations to be obtained from the respon-
dents. Particularly, subjects were encouraged to focus on critical
events or incidents [37]. Historical reconstruction of events was
subsequently performed by the field researcher. Intersubject re-
liability was increased by using the narratives from one subject
to confirm or contradict others in a social triangulation [33].
The study sought to use the rich insights available in the
case. For any case, insights into the escalation and de-escalation
processes can only be obtained from thorough immersion into
the transcripts for the case. The researcher used the texts (in-
terview transcripts, documents, and notes from observations)
for preparing a detailed case description of events (narrative as
instance) of the entire IS development process [45]. The pro-
cess includes the antecedent conditions and both the escalation
and de-escalation periods. This was done soon after completing
the case study. In order to reduce researcher bias and also to
validate that no important event had been missed in the case
summaries, a colleague was asked to take part in early analysis
of some of the data. The colleague was uninvolved in the field-
work and was therefore unfamiliar with case. The role of this
colleague was to “bring a different and possibly more objective
eye to the evidence” [11, p. 538]. The information he received
did not include the field researcher’s list of events and ratings.
Next, the colleague developed his own list of the events and
ratings. A senior IS researcher was also involved in comment-
ing at later stages on the field researcher’s list of events and
ratings. Both the colleague and the senior IS researcher were in-
volved in characterizing the events as “positive,” “ambiguous,”
or “negative” independently. The purpose of this was to detect
any bias in the research approach. Data from various sources
coalesced and built a specific narrative that explained the pro-
cess outcomes [45]. This narrative was then mapped onto the
dynamic punctuated equilibrium model shown in Fig. 1. The
researcher went through the interview transcripts several times
and made changes to the process diagrams where necessary.
The next step of the analysis was to determine the approach
and avoidance attributes at several critical events in the develop-
ment process. Besides the events, key decision makers were also
identified. Their motivations and underlying assumptions were
first considered before analyzing their decisions. The approach-
avoidance process model (shown in Fig. 1) was used as the basis
for identifying and organizing the attributes. These approach-
avoidance attributes were compared and contrasted against the
array of factors that contribute to escalation and the triggering
activities that promote de-escalation discussed in the IS devel-
opment literature. The entire data analysis process went through
numerous iterations [25] to formulate a coherent and consistent
overview of the case organization.
V. QUEUE REMOVAL SYSTEM AT BRITISH UTILITIES
CALL CENTER
This section presents background information about BU and
the queue removal system. The case offers an insight into the
arrays of attributes that influenced the project escalation and
de-escalation processes of the queue removal system project at
BU. This section describes the project development process as a
sequential pattern of events over the history of the project. These
events are examined at three levels—project (P), work (W), and
environmental (E). This section presents the series of events in
the project development process at BU, the intersecting work
and environmental events and the antecedent conditions.
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A. Project-Level (P) Events
1) Antecedent Conditions: At the time of our research, BU
was a large utility company in the U.K., serving almost 13 mil-
lion customers. The company was offering a comprehensive
range of services including providing water and waste water
treatment; the supply of high-quality water treatment products
and services; water process engineering; the design and con-
struction of major infrastructure; planning and asset manage-
ment; project management; customer services; and specialist
consultancy. The organization offers many customer solutions
that vary from recently improved helpline facilities and bill
payment services to mobile drop-in centers. The organization
serves over 13 million domestic and commercial customers in
the U.K. It takes 2.2 million meter readings and sends out 6.5
million bills per year for its 3.5 million accounts. To manage
this operation, to meet the needs of its customers, and ensure
the bills it sends out are paid, the company relies on com-
plex IS to help make payments easier for its customers. The
customer call center was the central point of contact for all BU
customers. It accommodated approximately 1300 staff. The cus-
tomer call center handled approximately 3.3 million telephone
calls per year and received 500 000 pieces of correspondence.
Two thirds of which related to customer bills and one third re-
lated to water supply and sewerage service matters. BU realized
that typical daily peaks and calls in response to the monthly
billing could result in customers being kept waiting on-hold.
The enquiries could result in heavy call volumes that ran up
an average of 50 people waiting at any time. Such long queues
were unacceptable customer service to both the company and the
public.
Event P1: Proposal for a Queue Removal System (Positive)
To resolve the long queues, BU planned to develop and in-
stall a queue removal system to make it easier for customers
calling its billing and customer service lines. Its motivation
in installing the queue removal system was purely customer
focused—to improve customer service at busy times and in the
event of any unforeseen circumstance causing an increase in the
call volume. Besides, the company also recognized that losing
a customer call on a billing line could mean a delay in pay-
ment, triggering unnecessary statements, lengthened enquiry
times, and even greater administration costs. While difficult to
quantify, it was believed that an improved customer service and
enquiry handling would achieve a cash flow benefit and reduce
the administration costs. Sophie explained why improvement
was necessary:
First, the customers would not waste their time waiting on hold since
a call agent would return their call instead. Second, a shorter call
time would allow call agents to answer more calls and this would
improve the turnover time per call. (Sophie, Call Center Assistant
Manager, March 18, 2003, #BU-7)
Chris also explained how the system would work:
When a customer calls in, if no one answers within 20 seconds,
the system would prompt him or her for a name and it would auto-
matically capture the caller’s phone number. The system would also
suggest an estimated call back time. The system would provide for
three return calls before erasing the number from its memory. (Chris,
Call Center Manager, March 6, 2003, #BU-6)
The project started in May 2001 and was expected to roll out
after one year. The initial budget for the project was £1 million.
Event P2: Ease of Integration With Existing System Infras-
tructure (Positive)
The whole customization and integration process progressed
very well:
The customization and integration were completed quickly and the
whole process seemed very smooth. It was non-invasive and it in-
tegrated easily with the existing systems and network. (Andy, IS
Project Manager, February 4, 2003, #BU-4)
Event P3: Disappointment Among Project Group Members
(Negative)
Even though the pilot test progressed smoothly, some project
group members realized that the system did not perform exactly
the way they thought it would:
It was completely inflexible. For example, during the callbacks,
when the call was answered by someone else rather than the original
caller, who might be temporarily unavailable, the caller would have
to rejoin the long queue. The system would not allow call agents to
set the timings for re-dialing under any circumstances. (Johnny, Call
Center Agent, May 4, 2003, #BU-14)
The original idea was to make everything faster by reducing the
queues. But it did not seem so for me. For example, when a caller
had made repeated calls, the system would register his/her number
several times in the queue even though it was from the same person.
That did not make sense to me and wasted a lot of our time. (Sam,
Call Center Agent, April 28, 2003, #BU-3)
Event P4: Errors in Information Processing (Negative)
Both the business director and Richard were unaware that
some project members were disappointed:
The customer call center manager and assistant manager did not
realize any problem with the system. It was my people (IS manager
and IS programmer) who reported the limitations of the system to
me. (Richard, IS Director, July 12, 2003, #BU-19)
Event P5: Departure of Both Customer Call Center Manager
and Assistant Manager (Negative)
Both the customer call center manager and assistant man-
ager left the organization abruptly. Many linked their departures
with the high number of complaints received from the public
regarding the call center’s poor customer service:
They could not solve the problem. I supposed they had both pinned
their hopes on the callback system to reduce the long queues within
a short time and improve customer service. (Johnny, Call Center
Agent, May 4, 2003, #BU-14)
The Business director might have a part to play in their departure. It
was obvious that he was very displeased with the fact that both of
them had tried to keep the problems from his knowledge. (Thomas,
ACD Engineer, March 28, 2003, #BU-9)
The call center manager’s departure in September 2001 dealt
a serious blow to the project since he was both the initiator and
manager of the project.
Event P6: Project Began to “Drift” (Negative)
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The project was dealt another blow when the business director
who was also the project champion left the company. No specific
reason was given for his departure. However, the project was
certainly in a dire situation. With both project champion and
project manager absent, the remaining group members turned
their attention to other projects. The next two months saw no
project activities. There was no involvement from the top man-
agement and the project members. It was not until two months
later (around December 2001) that the head of the company
called for a meeting.
Event P7: Appointment of New Project Champion and Project
Manager (Ambiguous)
After the meeting, the top management decided to continue
with the project, even though it was widely perceived by the
project members and line executives as ineffective in resolving
the problem of long call queues. The resources that were already
invested, the project being close to completion, and the symbolic
significance of a pro-customer project were cited as the three
main reasons for the decision to continue the project:
Even though some project members had doubts, however, since we
had already invested so much, plus the idea of finally being able to
complete the project seemed attractive to continue the project. More
importantly, the management wanted to show to the public and the
authority that the organization was trying to rectify the problem.
(Andy, IS Project Manager, February 4, 2003, #BU-4)
Wesley, Chris, and Sophie were appointed the new business
director, customer call center manager, and assistant manager,
respectively. Wesley was also appointed the new project cham-
pion. In addition, the top management allocated an additional
£500 000 to complete the purchase of the entire system. Since
Chris was still new to the organization, he requested that two
of his assistants from the call center be included in the project
group. Their main role was to orientate him regarding various
functions and coordination of interdepartmental project mem-
bers during group meetings. The addition of the two assistants
to the project group also symbolized further commitment to the
project. While Chris was still adjusting to the new environment,
Danny was appointed as the new project manager.
Event P8: Change of Project Leadership (Negative)
In February 2002, Danny had to leave the project group to
take up two important Automatic Calling Distribution upgrading
projects at a BU subsidiary company. This was more bad news
for the project. With Chris heavily involved with other customer
call center initiatives, the implementation of the new system was
yet again delayed. No one knew what was going to happen to
the new system. The project was left to flounder for six weeks.
Despite its gloomy prospect, the project development did not
seem to be coming to an end:
The head of the company had indicated that he would allow the
project to continue until the development was completed. He had to
see it through since he felt personally responsible for the project.
Furthermore, we suspected that the project development wouldn’t
be far away from the end-point. (Richard, IS Director, July 12, 2003,
#BU-19)
Event P9: Adding New Modules to the System (Ambiguous)
Andy was appointed the new project manager. After exam-
ining the new system, Andy summoned both Lance (IS Con-
tractor) and Steve (IS Contractor) to discuss the possibility of
modifying the queue removal system. Lance suggested includ-
ing a customized module to the complete system, which could
greatly improve its performance. However, such a customized
module would incur a further cost of £250 000. Andy supported
the additional investment:
We could make the system more flexible by adding a few function
keys in the system to allow call agents a greater control of the queue.
The original system could be transformed into some sophisticated
applications that span business functions. (Andy, IS Project Manager,
April 14, 2003, #BU-12)
Despite the promise of the new modules, several project
members were skeptical about whether they could effectively
enhance the system performance after their earlier disappoint-
ments (i.e., Event 3).
Event P10: Hiring an Outside Consultant to Assess the De-
cision to Further Invest (Ambiguous)
Andy, with the consultant’s help, prepared a new business
plan justifying the additional investment to the top manage-
ment. Even though £250 000 was not considered a large sum,
its approval as additional investment in a “troubled” system
was less straightforward. With the assistance of the consultant,
Andy conducted a survey to assess call agents’ feedback on the
system:
The results were encouraging. However, the setback was that the
caller queue had fallen only by five percent. The figure was not
significant enough for us to conclude that the system had addressed
our problem of long ‘phone queues. Nevertheless, we also realized
that it was a complicated problem which could involve other issues
such as an insufficient number of call agents or an inaccurate billing
system. (Sophie, Call Center Assistant Agent, July 12, 2003, #BU-21)
In April 2002, despite the mixed results, the consultant rec-
ommended adding new modules to the system. The consultant’s
analysis suggested that an enhancement of the system could
reduce call queues by 20%.
Event P11: Senior Directors’ Support Toward Further Invest-
ment (Positive)
With the consultant’s positive report, the senior directors
seemed to support a sophisticated system that offered signif-
icant advantage over the previous version:
The directors were happy to see that the call agents liked the sys-
tem. It could be used as publicity to demonstrate that the company
was already working to improve its customer service. (Richard, IS
Director, July 12, 2003, #BU-19)
Event P12: Head of Company’s Commitment to Continued
Investment (Positive)
The head of the company was clearly responsible for the
additional investment of £250 000 in the project. He approved
it without going through the budget committee:
The head of the company reiterated his support towards this project.
He reckoned that further improvements could bring out the full
potential of the system and eventually justified his earlier decision.
(Wesley, Business Director, November 11, 2002, #BU-1)
Event P13: Trial Runs (Positive)
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The modified call queue removal system was installed be-
hind the internal telephone system, connected to BU’s Rockwell
Spectrum ACD via standard digital telephone connections. The
company conducted several trial runs on the system and they
were all very successful. BU engaged an independent research
company to conduct another customer satisfaction survey to as-
sess customers’ and agents’ feedback on the new system. Chris
summarized the survey results:
85 percent of customers said the new system had improved their
opinion of the company and 92 percent of agents believed the new
system reduced the number of angry and frustrated customers they
had to deal with. (Chris, Call Center Manager, March 6, 2003, #BU-
6)
Event P14: Abandonment of the Queue Removal System (Out-
come)
Just as the system was about to be launched and much to
everyone’s surprise, it was abandoned abruptly in August 2002.
The project had cost the organization £1.75 million. Appar-
ently, the long queues and public complaints had both van-
ished due to several initiatives and incidents (refer to work- and
environmental-level analyses later).
B. Work-Level (W) Events
1) Antecedent Conditions: The customer call center was di-
vided into two main departments: billing and operations. The
billing department dealt with customer billing enquiries such
as missing bills and change of payment plans. The operations
department was responsible for customer complaints such as
no water supply and the rupture of sewerage pipes. Prior to the
launch of the new queue removal system project, the call center
faced heavy call volumes, running up an average of 50 people
waiting at any time during the peak periods of the day. Both the
company and the public considered such long queues unaccept-
able. Therefore, it was crucial for BU to find a solution quickly.
Besides the new queue removal system, the customer call center
also focused on other areas of improvements. For example, it
improved its coordination with the finance department, so that
it knew when customer bills would be sent out in order to better
predict and manage customers’ billing enquires.
Event W4: Escalating Customer Complaints and Poor Staff
Morale
The public made a number of complaints about customer
service at the call center, which reflected the chaotic state the
call center was in. Sam explained:
We had no idea why there were so many public enquiries about their
bills. We had to investigate if there was a problem at our finance
department. Anyway, the call center manager had a very difficult
time since we were downsizing and could not hire additional call
agents to handle the influx of calls. Even though the new queue
removal system could provide automatic callback service, it did
not seem capable of removing the long call queues as many were
repetitive calls. (Sam, Call Center Agent, April 28, 2003, #BU-13)
Johnny also commented on the situation at that time:
We did not have the right system supporting us. Our morale was
very low since we were getting callers shouting at us so frequently.
(Johnny, Call Center Agent, May 4, 2003, #BU-14)
Event W10: Internal Survey of Agents’ and Customers’ Feed-
back on the Pilot System
The customer call center conducted a survey to assess call
agents’ feedback on the pilot system. Comments were kept
anonymous to encourage more participation in the survey and
also to obtain genuine feedback:
The agents liked it. They were in better control because when they
called the customers back, they would already know the customers’
details and what their problems were through the recorded message.
(Chris, Call Center Manager, March 6, 2003, #BU-6)
Event W14: Sudden Sharp Decrease in Call Queues
Around July 2002 and much to everyone’s surprise, the call
queues decreased tremendously and abruptly. Almost all incom-
ing calls could be handled immediately by the call agents. The
situation was closely monitored by the management. Various
reasons were offered to explain why the queues had eased:
We made several changes to the format of our bills at around April
2002. The new format was easier to comprehend and contained
itemized billing, with a daily breakdown. We also printed the lull
hours as the preferred hours for bill enquiries to even out the high
frequency of calls during peak hours. Besides the change in the
format of the bill, we continued our coordination with the call center
to plan the appropriate timings to send out our bills. (Mike, Finance
Manager, June 6, 2003, #BU-17)
C. Environmental Analysis (E)
Event E6: OFWAT’s Inquiry Into the Company’s Level of
Customer Service
OFWAT1 received a complaint from the public about poor
customer service at BU. This led to OFWAT’s investigation into
the situation at BU. Subsequently, OFWAT required that BU
improve its customer service immediately. Failure to comply
would incur an initial fine and more serious consequences later:
OFWAT made an official inquiry into poor customer service at the
call center. That could be part of the reason why the call center man-
ager, assistant manager and business director left the organization.
(Wesley, Business Director, November 11, 2002, #BU-1)
The call center manager seemed to attribute the high influx of calls
to our billing system. We had to conduct a thorough investigation to
check if there was any problem with the accuracy of the bills. (Mike,
Finance Manager, June 6, 2003, #BU-17)
Event E14: Incidents Related to the Sudden Sharp Decrease
in Call Queues
Several incidents outside the remit of the project group might
have led to the abandonment of the project.
One of our sewerage pipes was leaking chemical contents off a
pharmaceutical plant. Unfortunately, the leak occurred near a fishery
and contaminated its water and killed most of the fish. When the
emergency call was made, our call agent did not handle it and that
triggered the system to activate the callback service. When we finally
responded to the emergency call, it was so late that the leak had nearly
wiped out all the fish in the farm. It was a shortcoming in the system
1The Office of Water Services is the economic regulator for the water and
sewerage treatment industry in the U.K., and its primary responsibility is to
ensure water companies in the country provide customers good quality and
efficient Services at fair prices.
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that we had overlooked. (Wesley, Business Director, November 11,
2002, #BU-1)
It could also be partly attributed to the loss of five percent of our
customers from June to August 2002. These customers had switched
to another water company for some unknown reasons. (Wesley, Busi-
ness Director, November 11, 2002, #BU-1)
The senior directors were shocked by the loss of five percent of
our customers. They took this matter very seriously since among
the customers that switched to another water company, two were
multinational pharmaceutical companies that were highly regarded
by BU. This triggered a decision by the top management to invest
in a fully fledged CRM system that would provide a total customer
relationship management solution for all its clients, especially the
commercial customers. The queue removal system could no longer
fulfill the strategic needs of BU. (Richard, IS Director, July 12, 2003,
#BU-19)
I still felt that OFWAT’s watchful eye had pressured the management
to invest and implement a better customer service system. (Thomas,
ACD Engineer, March 28, 2003, #BU-9)
Approach and avoidance attributes and the decisions that de-
termine the trajectory of the project are summarized in Table IV.
Fig. 2 is a process diagram that describes and explains the call
center project development process at BU. From the process
diagram, we can infer that the project had an escalatory period
over Events 3–6, a de-escalation triggering activity at Event 7,
another escalating event at Event 8, and a turnaround attempt
over Events 9–13. Event 14 indicates that the project was fi-
nally abandoned. The process diagram also highlights a series
of conflicting approach and avoidance attributes that influenced
the decisions that helped shape the trajectory of the project.
Table V provides a summary of the process model features and
how they could be applied in the BU case.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Escalation and De-Escalation as Instances of Approach-
Avoidance Conflict
Our results support the view that several escalation theories
in the IS literature are much more intertwined than previously
supposed [32]. More importantly, our findings confirm that the
escalation phenomenon in a project can be explained by more
than one theory [23]. Moreover, escalation can be viewed as in-
stances of approach-avoidance conflict [50], and that approach-
avoidance attributes operate simultaneously in a project [10].
Extending the existing argument in the escalation literature,
we propose that de-escalation can also be viewed as instances
of approach-avoidance conflict. For example, in the BU case,
Project Events 10–12 (the period of de-escalation) show that
top management decided to continue the project despite the
conflicting influences of both approach (i.e., strong champion
who provided continued funding and protection) and avoidance
attributes (i.e., mixed signals regarding the system’s effective-
ness).
In addition, several approach and avoidance attributes found
in our study may offer some interesting insights into the phe-
nomena of commitment escalation and de-escalation. First, our
analysis suggests that ambiguous initial performance data had
prompted the project group members to reconsider continuing
the project.
This finding contrasts sharply with the results presented by
some of the earlier escalation studies that suggest that ambigu-
ous performance data contributes to project escalation [47], [48].
Generally, ambiguity can be viewed as an attribute that encour-
ages both persistence [32] and desistance with a project. It can
be viewed as an avoidance attribute since a risk-averse decision
maker may pull the plug on an “ambiguous” project.
Second, the BU case involved a high turnover of project man-
agers and champion that affected the project and led to a series
of escalation and de-escalation cycles. The important difference
between the case and previous escalation cases [9], [20], [35],
[48] is the frequency of the departure of the key project execu-
tives. Previous escalation studies [20], [48] suggest that commit-
ment may decline sharply following the exit of key executives
in the project. However, some escalation studies also suggest
that a change in the project leadership may still be insufficient
in itself to break the cycle of escalation [8], [35]. The BU case
indicates that even though commitment might have declined
following the exit of key executives in the project, the project
continued to absorb valuable resources (e.g., project members’
time and costs). The case also offers two reasons why the change
of project leadership was insufficient in itself to break the cycle
of escalation. The first reason is that the new project champion
and project managers did not alter the previous failing course of
action. Instead, they allow the troubled project to continue to be
entrapped within the escalation cycle. Another reason is that the
key executives who departed had relatively low political power
in influencing the abandonment of the troubled project [42]. It
could be that these executives would easily be substituted by
other personnel and their departure would not bring about a col-
lapse of the project. In fact, the project was held together by the
Head of Company, who had relatively high political power in
influencing the continuance of the project.
Third, one of the main reasons why an organization persists
with a project is that the project may symbolize pro-consumer
behavior without ever delivering improvements. In the case
of BU, the project was used to publicly demonstrate that the
company was already working to improve its customer service,
thereby presenting a positive image to the public. Unfortunately,
this strategy has a limited “shelf-life.” In the case of BU (and
many other companies), the customers will not tolerate such
poor service indefinitely.
Fourth, an unexpected event could lead to sudden project
abandonment. In the case study, the demand for the new system
vanished when the long call queues eased dramatically from
June to August 2002. This followed the redesign of the bills.
It is noted here that the case organization was not well coordi-
nated otherwise changing the billing format would have been
fixed prior to the investment of the system. The fall in demand
was totally unexpected and triggered project reappraisal, which
eventually led to project abandonment. This outcome is similar
to that of a multimillion dollar software project that involved
more than a decade of development and reported by Keil [20].
In that case, the decision to “pull the plug” was driven, in part, by
a sudden downturn in the industry that created a financial crisis
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for the company, forcing managers to reevaluate their priorities.
Last, the detection of a serious deficiency within the system is
another important avoidance attribute that could explain why the
top management may decide to abandon a project. In the case
of BU, the incident of pollution from a sewerage pipe rupture
highlighted a serious flaw in the working procedures within the
callback system. The detection of serious system deficiency has
not been documented as a key avoidance attribute in previous
de-escalation literature, but as the BU case clearly demonstrates,
it may be a valid reason for a project to be abandoned.
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Fig. 2. Process diagram of the call center project at BU.
TABLE V
SUMMARY OF THE PROCESS MODEL FEATURES AND HOW THEY COULD BE APPLIED IN THE BU CASE
B. Sequences of Multiple Mistakes (Mistake Chains) May
Contribute to Project Escalation
Mittelstaedt [34] has identified several attributes that may
contribute to sequences of multiple mistakes (mistake chains)
in projects such as:
1) failure to believe information that you dislike;
2) success that breeds arrogance and adversely affects deci-
sion making;
3) failure to evaluate assumptions;
4) frequent communications absence, failure, or misunder-
standing (internal and external, including customers);
5) cultures that suppress initiative, information, or action;
6) failure to evaluate past mistakes and learn from them.
Understanding the nature of these attributes has serious impli-
cations for managers since major crises often involve a unique
set of compounded errors occurring in sequence. In most cases,
if warnings had been observed and acted upon earlier, mistake
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chains would have been avoided. Mittelstaedt [34] has listed sev-
eral of these warning signs that presage typical mistake chains.
For example, results off plan, constant revision of plan/budget,
failures of control systems, and frequent operational problems
that are not addressed by standard procedures. The occurrence
of any of these warning signs does not in itself signal a major cri-
sis but indicates a need for further investigation, so as to ensure
that one is not in the process of starting a series of mistakes for
the project.
Our examination of mistakes within the BU case reveals a
chain of mistakes that ought to have been recognized as potential
“red flags” and had contributed to project escalation. All of these
were behaviors or actions that had been encountered during the
project development process and were catalysts for events that
inflicted damage to the project. The details of the mistake chain
are summarized as follows.
1) Failure to obtain complete understanding of the system
(Event P3): Some project group members realized that the
system was not exactly performing the way they thought
it would. Some of the members reckoned that they should
not go ahead with the purchase of the complete system.
2) Failure to provide negative feedback (Event P4): Both
the business director and Richard (the IS director) were
unaware of some of the project members’ disappointment
over how much the system could actually achieve. They
claimed that none of the project members told them about
the new system’s limitations.
3) Permitting the departure of both customer call center man-
ager and assistant manager (Event P5): The call center
manager’s departure dealt a serious blow to the project
since he was both project initiator (champion) and project
manager.
4) Neglecting the project and allowing it to drift (Event P6):
The situation was unclear at that time. With both project
champion and project manager absent, the rest of the group
members turned their attention to other projects. The next
two months saw almost no activities. The project was left
to flounder with no involvement from the top manage-
ment and the project members, i.e., it became a ghost
project.
Often IS development and implementation are punctuated by
unexpected outcomes and side effects that require project man-
agers to “muddle through” the entire development process [5].
However, in most cases, project development requires incre-
mental adaptations [24] as project managers learn by trial and
error and gathering further information. By breaking the cy-
cle of escalation early, projects could avoid becoming “out of
control” [5]. Likewise in the mistake chain, any of the events
may suggest a window of opportunity to alter the failing course
of action (i.e., mistakes) or unfreezing commitment to a previ-
ous failing course of action [43]. For example, if the decisions
had been altered in both Events 3 and 4 to include a reeval-
uation of the new investment, the escalation cycle might have
been broken early in the project. However, by failing to unfreeze
commitment to previous failing course of action (i.e., mistakes),
previous beliefs and attitudes may remain unchanged. Such be-
liefs and attitudes to previous failing course of action (mistakes)
may even be reinforced that may contribute to project escala-
tion [44].
The mistake chain identified in the case of BU is significant
and includes attributes identified in many project escalation sit-
uations. The examples include “failure to provide negative feed-
back” [20] and “permitting the departure of both customer call
center manager and assistant manager” [38]. The case findings
suggest that it is easy for project groups to feel comfortable
with the way things are progressing until alarming crises strike.
In our case, three critical incidents occurred—the investigation
by OFWAT, the dead fish, and the loss of key customers—each
of which captured top management’s immediate attention and
triggered change. Projects may easily veer off track and drift.
During the development process at BU, there was evidence of
confusion or lack of information (failure to obtain complete un-
derstanding of the system) that troubled those involved. All of
these mistakes were important in keeping the mistake sequence
accelerating, and BU failed to call a “timeout” for clarifications.
The ignored signals presented in the mistake chain illustrate
continued escalation of events from a straightforward operating
abnormality to a serious failure to manage multiple mistakes.
Our findings confirm that multiple, conflicting objectives ought
to be dealt with not by attending to them simultaneously but in
sequence [7].
C. Intersections Between the Project-, Work-, and Environm-
ental-Level Events May Trigger Both Escalation and De-
Escalation Cycles
In this paper, we have argued that project- and work-level
events unfold simultaneously in an organization and its environ-
ment, and influence materially the progress of the project. Our
data analysis of the BU case supported this argument and sug-
gests that the project-, work-, and environmental-level events
unfolded synchronously and mostly independently during the
project development process. Their necessary intersections trig-
gered both the escalation and de-escalation cycles in the project.
For instance, Event 4 at the work level offers some insights as
to why the project was allowed to continue despite the emer-
gence of negative information. The project was viewed by the
organization as an immediate remedy for resolving the increas-
ing customer complaints against BU’s poor customer service.
The previous call center manager had no other quick solution
to resolve the problem and might have wrongly pinned all his
hopes on the new queue removal system as he was emotion-
ally bonded to the project. In addition, Event 14 at the work
level sheds some light on why the de-escalation effort was sus-
tained. The customer call center conducted a survey to assess
call agents’ feedback on the pilot system. The agents’ comments
were positive that helped significantly toward legitimizing the
new course of action. The endorsement by the agents is crucial
since, in the final phase of de-escalation, once an alternative
course of action has been selected, managers need to assess the
level of support from internal constituencies and not assume
that the actors will necessarily follow [35]. Pan et al. [43] also
suggest that in refreezing new attitudes and behavior, organi-
zations should implement influence tactics to ensure “buy in”
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and monitor the sustainability of the new belief. Therefore, in
the case of BU, the positive survey results helped to strengthen
project stakeholders’ beliefs and confidence in the new course
of action.
Similarly, our environmental analysis also offers insights as
to why the project manager left the organization abruptly. Event
6 at the outer environmental level highlights that OFWAT had
received complaints from the public about the poor customer
service at BU. This led to OFWAT’s investigation of BU. The
project manager and the project champion might have been held
responsible by the senior management for the poor customer ser-
vice, and their departure could be viewed as an immediate re-
sponse to the external pressure. This incident provided BU with
an opportunity to reassess its project [20], [48]. As Montealegre
and Keil [35, p. 433] suggest, it is not uncommon that outside
pressure could force “a closer examination of the course of ac-
tion.” Nevertheless, in the case of BU, the organization failed to
capitalize on this opportunity to reassess the project conditions.
Event 14 at the environmental level also suggests that incidents
in external context that were outside the remit of the project
group, could lead to a significant impact on the project (i.e.,
abandonment). These so-called random environmental events
could kill a project, and if they escalate over time, there is a
greater risk that one or more will affect the project outcome.
The examples from the case of BU suggest that the neces-
sary intersections of work-, project-, and environmental-level
events are subtle but critical interplays between simultaneous
processes and events. By positing that the project development
process should be examined at multiple levels of social analysis
(project, work, and environmental), we have introduced greater
explanatory power and reconciled the contradictions in the sepa-
rate processes of the organization [6]. Overall, this demonstrates
that any process analysis has to carefully outline an influence
and its direction at various points along the evolutionary path
in order to show how the project constitutes and influences its
context and vice versa.
VII. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
In this final section, based on our findings, we offer sugges-
tions to stakeholders including senior managers, project leaders,
customers, and researchers. These are summarized in Table VI.
A. Senior Managers
For senior management, we see their importance in support-
ing major information technology (IT) projects both initially
when the system is chosen and the budget agreed, and later
when important decisions and interventions have to be made. IS
are always going to be a struggle to implement so they should
not be undertaken lightly. Once you have chosen a system, that
commitment is likely to last many years. Also where possible,
the projects should be limited in duration. The longer they ex-
ist, the higher the risk of problems occurring or the technology
becoming obsolete. From the senior manager’s perspective, it
is hardly surprising to learn that a project’s budget and length
are often wildly underestimated. In our case, both budget and
time quickly escalated. However, what is not so obvious is the
importance of understanding historical, antecedent conditions.
Other rationalities have to be chosen to begin a large, com-
plex IS project if the company has a habit of failure in previous
efforts (unless negative patterns can be broken by a deliber-
ate intervention and punctuation). This also suggests that large
projects should rarely be attempted using a big bang approach,
but by dividing them into smaller, more manageable subprojects
and assessing project capabilities, i.e., how different levels of
systems can be punctuated synchronously. Ambitious, lengthy
projects are inherently risky as they become increasingly vic-
tims of internal and external vicissitudes, drift, and punctuations
both at the work system and the organizational level associated
with such shocks as key personnel leaving, strategies chang-
ing, and new technologies appearing. Senior managers could
also be circumspect as to how much change their organization
can tolerate. Indeed, the evidence here suggests they need to
think of large-scale ISD change as speculative, risky, and exper-
imental. And while this applies in particular to large, bespoke
systems, as in this case, “off-the-shelf” commoditized solutions
such as enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems are not less
immune from such problems [9]. For managers and users, our
model illustrates that interactions with the project can be time-
consuming and stressful. It is easy to get embroiled in complex
software, hardware, and organizational issues: good managers
should protect their staff from too much uncertainty, and allo-
cate sufficient resources to enable learning about ISD change.
Newman and Robey [37] noted that insurance claims staff were
heroically struggling to cope with change, uncertainty, and fail-
ure. However, on the positive side, they also reported the consid-
erable resources targeted at the claims personnel to ameliorate
this problem (e.g., a model office, business analysts, etc.).
B. Project Leaders
Our research also shows that implementation is a complex
process and that project leaders need to manage the process:
looking for signs of stalling or delays and intervening accord-
ingly. In our case, major problems occurred that were required
the project leader to resolve. In some cases, it may be necessary
to design strategies to encourage the project to proceed. Trajec-
tories are path dependent and commitments made can become
future constraints. However, the original project leader at BU
was experiencing problems that were structural and not of his
own making. If BU had recognized the real problem and fixed
the billing system at the outset, the need for the queuing system
may never have arisen.
Also, from the IS personnel perspective, the process model
shows why early decisions can cause an escalation that later
require “band aids.” It seems wise to invest time and resources
in these early decisions. Moreover, during the management of
the project, critical issues can emerge some of which are within
the control of project leaders while other, external events will
arise that are beyond their control as in our case. So both proac-
tive and reactive stances are needed, and these were both ob-
served at BU. The model also reveals the possibility of creating
change through launching critical incidents that can lead to
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punctuations. A project manager would do well to recognize
when a project is lurching toward failure or getting mired in a
dispute and try to unfreeze the process [37].
C. Customers
Customers both large and small can have a major effect on
companies. In the case of BU, a regulated company, customer
complaints led to an intervention from the regulator, OFWAT,
a powerful government “quango.” Additionally, BU lost two
major customers that focused senior managers’ minds on the
problem even more sharply.
The queuing project was used to publicly demonstrate that the
company was already working to improve its customer service,
thereby presenting a positive image to the public. This strategy
has a limited “shelf-life.” In the case of BU (and many other
companies), the customers will not tolerate such poor service
indefinitely. Generally, organizations have to manage relation-
ships with users effectively.
In summary, we recognize that many of the aforementioned
findings and implications for stakeholders are not unique and
much of the professional literature on project management is re-
plete with such suggestions. For example, the Project Manage-
ment Body of Knowledge (PMBoK) and the later International
Project Management Association Competence Baseline (ICB)
competence elements recognize, among other issues, context,
success and failure criteria, risks, conflicts and crises, busi-
ness processes, organizational learning, and the management
of change. All of these elements would be considered central
concepts in the IS literature. However, our approach-avoidance
process model does add to our understanding of the process of
project management and its implications for the various parties
involved. For example, while both guidelines talk about project
context and stakeholders, a process approach fleshes out what
that means in a specific project and thereby what it might imply
for other projects. At BU, the customers (both large and small)
had a major impact on the company, and indirectly, the queuing
system and the personnel involved. The process model shows
the interplay between these unexpected and unrelated events
(context) the project (the project leader’s resignation and the
project drifting) and the work system (the call center manager’s
exit). Furthermore, the process model shows the advantage of
explicating the nature of the system being built, something hith-
erto underreported in the escalation literature. Not all systems
are vital to a company as was the case at BU allowing senior
managers to terminate the project.
However, for the rest of this section, we will concentrate on
what the implications of our process model might be for IS re-
searchers. The message for researchers is that empirical process
models like the approach-avoidance model, while being labor-
intensive and time-consuming, yield many insights absent from
the more conventional factor studies. While factor studies tell us
what variables may be related to outcomes, process models tell
us how the story of implementation unfolds over time, linking
history to outcomes and placing the story within the context of
the organization and beyond. Carmel and Becker’s work [4] is
an example of a process model but it was specific to packaged
software development and somewhat overspecified limiting its
usefulness as a research framework for ISD projects. Factor
studies often sample multiple projects in many organizations
making them a-historical, a-processual, and a-contextual. For
example, Tiwana and Keil [56] collected risk data about ISD
projects from 60 IT managers. Hargrave and Johnson [16] sur-
veyed 1500 systems developers finally obtaining a sample of n
= 150 in their research into object-oriented systems develop-
ment. The disadvantage of process models is that they can only
examine a relatively few cases. In contrast, factor models can
look for statistical associations across many cases, linking fac-
tors such as top management support, culture, resistance, etc.,
with measures of outcomes. But the two approaches (factor vs.
process) have widely different ontological and epistemological
assumptions. In contrast to the factor approach, top manage-
ment support is treated in process studies as a process, not a
variable. Such support is shown as an unfolding sequence of
events (e.g., interventions) that can influence the development
process, as in our BU case. In factor studies, such processes are
reduced to cross-sectional variables, measured on a five-point
Likert scale, for example, and because the sampling may in-
volve many projects in many organizations, there is no common
history or context. The explanatory power common to process
studies cannot be derived from factor studies.
In the field of ISD, many events occur during the project pro-
cess some of which will be planned and some serendipitous.
Unexpected events during projects are common and can arise
internally (e.g., BU’s bill redesign) or externally (e.g., sewer-
age outfall). These events are often unique and actors have to
react to them. Some critical issues related to ISD have been
extensively discussed in the literature on organizational change,
IS project implementation process, and IS success and failure.
This research followed Lyytinen and Newman’s [28], Newman
and Zhu’s [39], and Pan et al.’s [44] approaches that has shown
through the use of a contemporary case studies, critical events
that occurred along the project process can affect the stability
(i.e., equilibrium) of the project process.
The process itself in the case of BU was identified as a se-
quence of events where the connections between a preceding
event and its consequences were depicted. The interactions be-
tween the organizational work process and project process were
also analyzed. For example, we show that a critical event on
the organizational work level can generate a similar event at
the build level, and vice versa. The idea of combining events
both at the project system and work system level (i.e., a co-
evolution of both systems during process analysis) is some-
thing that hitherto has been mostly noted in passing. A no-
table exception is Orlikowski and Hofman’s [40] study that dis-
tinguished between planned, emergent, and opportunity-driven
change. Their emergent change concept is similar to incremen-
tal change in work systems; while planned/opportunity changes
cover punctuations in work systems. Therefore, both planned
and opportunity-driven changes imply the creation of plans, and
thus, carry the idea of a separate project system. Orlikowski and
Hofman [40] also recognize the critical role of capabilities and
routines within the project system (they call it the system sup-
port) in enabling planned/opportunistic change. Their analysis
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does not, however, offer any systematic way to analyze mecha-
nisms that generate change at multiple levels—other than refer-
ring to organizational learning, nor do they analyze alternative
scenarios how system use could proceed after different building
system interventions.
Through our case study, several findings were generated. First
of all, in line with previous empirical studies, the project con-
text, including organizational context and external environmen-
tal context, was shown to play an essential role in the project
implementation process. Process equilibrium can be seriously
disturbed by the critical events that occurred in the implementa-
tion context. But this is hardly new. However, we found that the
ability of the project team in dealing with unexpected events is
vital in ensuring the stability of a project process. In contrast,
drift can lead to chaotic behavior and delays as at BU. Un-
questionably, the past project patterns or similar patterns from
other system processes, as have been suggested in much liter-
ature, have significant impacts on the present project patterns.
We have shown how negative patterns can be reproduced. How-
ever, when it comes to the case that critical events occur totally
unexpectedly, such as a natural disaster like the sewage outfall,
the knowledge generated from past project patterns or similar
patterns from other systems may be of little use.
Overall, our process study provides rich insights into the
historical patterning effects of success and failure, i.e., how
behaviors and structures become reinforced by repetition [46]
and how these patterns influence future outcomes. History does
repeat itself sometimes many times, and organizations often get
mired in patterns of failure [29]. Historical patterning also shows
how a failed project outcome becomes the antecedent condition
for any new building effort. At BU, abandoning the queuing
system may have further implications for the company when
they contemplate new project proposals. Failure can become
an opportunity for learning or a cyclical pattern repeated many
times [46]. This has parallels with other human activities in-
cluding those of competitive sports, e.g., soccer or horse-racing
or criminal trials, where actors use historical analyses to pre-
dict present or future performance. Likewise, in ISD change,
an organization will have IS “form,” or has made “irrevoca-
ble” commitments to technologies such as ERP systems, which
together can render planned ISD change ineffective without a
decisive intervention to establish new, positive trajectories [36].
Process research also provides further insights in understand-
ing the enigma of success and failure in ISD and concepts such
as escalation and de-escalation [22]. By linking history, pro-
cess, and context, we can trace the trajectory of a project and
show how the process is uniquely related to the outcome and
how the various stakeholders can variously capture the rhetoric
of success. For example, in a previous case [37], the project was
delivered five years late and four times over budget but was still
believed by the managers to be a success. This and other exam-
ples indicate that escalation or the commitment of resources to a
failing project and the demand to de-escalate such systems, ap-
pear to be simplistic from a process perspective. Specifically, in
the case of BU, the queuing system was revealed as nonessen-
tial to their future effectiveness. A relative cheap and simple
redesign of the bills removed the queues and thereby the mo-
tivation for the system. Again, clearly this was not predicted
by actors. In other cases, systems may be vital to the future of
the company. In such cases, time and budget overruns might be
escalating but they still needed the system: there is no escalation
or de-escalation in the demand for the system and they cannot
simply abandon it as they did at BU. Our analysis offers insights
into the complexity of assessing ISD change success and fail-
ure. In particular, we need to reframe concepts of escalation and
de-escalation [22].
Finally, we found it relatively straightforward to map the ev-
idence on to the approach-avoidance model. We would recom-
mend that other researchers, including Ph.D. candidates, con-
sider similar approaches to research. More cases using a process
approach will accumulate knowledge in this area. By following
a similar research paradigm, the research community will de-
velop rich data sets and theoretical understandings. They offer
plausible descriptions and explanations of ISD phenomena and
greater transparency of the process.
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